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Abstract 
 
Ethiopian montane rainforests are economically valuable repositories of biodiversity, 
especially of wild Coffea arabica populations, and they are vanishing at accelerating rates. Our 
research results confirm theory which explains biodiversity loss by diverging private and social 
net benefits from land conversion. Poor farmers basically live from hand-to-mouth and manage 
resources with very short term planning horizons. In such circumstances they cannot afford to 
carry the cost burden of conservation from which the broader national and global society 
benefits. Society, on the other hand, highly values the biodiversity of Ethiopia’s montane 
rainforests, but has not managed to put mechanisms in place which enable to pay for the 
conservation of these values and conservation policies are in place but are not implemented. 
While it is economically rational for the farmer to convert forests into agricultural land and 
thereby improve his income (the financial incentive we refer to here), it is economically 
irrational for national and global society not to pay for conservation. The core reasons for such 
divergence is that institutions for conservation and sustainable use are not in place. We identify 
the most important ones and recommend changes for the Ethiopian case. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Ethiopian montane forests belong to the Eastern Afromontane Biodiversity Hotspot, 
which is one of recognized 34 biodiversity hotspot areas in the world. In addition to having high 
species diversity with a large number of endemic species, the forests are of global importance 
because they contain the world’s only wild population of wild Coffea arabica (Gole 2003). 
Around 75% of the world’s coffee production is from Coffea arabica, and genetic information 
contained in Ethiopian highlands is important as a reservoir of genetic diversity, crucial for 
coffee breeding.  
 
The Afromontane rainforests of south-western Ethiopia represent a major proportion of 
Ethiopia’s total forests and offer suitable climatic and ecological conditions for agriculture and 
human settlement. Therefore, it is a favourable region for immigrants from the North and a 
considerable proportion of the total population and livestock are concentrated there. Based on 
estimates of climatic climax vegetation, the natural forests of Ethiopia might have covered up to 
40% of Ethiopia’s total land area (Reusing 1998).  
 
However, since several decades, there has been progressive degradation of forest 
resources in Ethiopia. Between 1990 and 2000, 141,000 ha of forest were lost every year, which 
equals an average annual deforestation rate of 0.93%. Then, between 2000 and 2005, the rate of 
deforestation increased by 10.4% to 1.03% per year, which totals to 14% (or around 2,114,000 
hectares) of forest cover loss in the 15 years between 1990 and 2005 (FAO 2007). Recent 
estimates by the Center for Development Research (Lieth, unpublished data) show that the area 
of closed forest cover has declined to about 3-4% of the country. In the Southern Region of 
Ethiopia, a recent study on deforestation and its drivers (Wakjira 2007) concludes that an area of 
originally 281,000 ha forest in 1973 has decreased to 191,000 ha in 2005, representing a 32% 
loss of forest cover in 32 years, leaving merely 13,000 ha or about 11.9 % of Ethiopia’s land area 
which is covered with forests (closed forest plus woodlands). 
 
Deforestation has important local, national, and global implications. At all levels, forests 
are repositories of biodiversity and biodiversity is not only an assemblage of different genes, 
plants and ecosystems but also a provider of various ecosystem goods and services (functions). 
Deforestation results in a loss of several other ecological functions like soil erosion, land 
degradation, water and air pollution which in turn affect the livelihoods of rural people. This is 
even more important in counties like Ethiopia, where the majority of the people are dependent on 
natural resources. Over 85% of the population in Ethiopia live in rural areas and depend on 
agriculture as means of livelihood. 
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Some of the most important drivers of deforestation in south-western Ethiopia are the 
conversion into agricultural land, establishment of plantations and population growth, also from 
resettlement programs. Rising coffee prices are also identified as a reason for converting forests 
into more productive semi-forest coffee agro-forestry systems. Increasing coffee prices without 
rules and incentives for growing and harvesting coffee sustainably, are an incentive to produce 
coffee more intensively or to collect more wild coffee from the forests and clear undergrowth 
vegetation which is competing with coffee, thereby eventually converting forests into more 
intensive land use forms and reducing biodiversity (Schmitt 2006).  
 
The broader socio-economic and political conditions in the forestry sector are similar to 
many developing countries which rely heavily on their natural resource base for economic 
development and repeats itself in Ethiopia: Poverty1 and population growth2, combined with 
market and institutional failure, like diverging de jure state ownership of land and de facto 
traditional private ownership or common property and therefore uncertain property rights, lead to 
a mutation of socio-ecological systems, in which actors behave in their own (and their families) 
immediate interest and treat forest resources as open access.  
 
In order to protect biodiversity, the government of Ethiopia has established a protected 
area system including 12 national parks, three wildlife sanctuaries, 8 wildlife reserve areas, 18 
controlled hunting areas, 3 coffee gene reserves and 58 national forest priority areas. In practice, 
however, the conservation capacity is low and the protected area system is little effective in 
arresting deforestation (Tadesse 2003).  
 
In July 1997 the Rural Land Proclamation determined that all land is state owned, that 
farmers are entitled to lifelong use and have inheritable and transferable use rights to the land 
and trees planted on that land. Proclamation No. 94/1994 determines the conservation, 
development, protection and utilization of forest resources. Although the proclamation 
recognizes three types of ownership of forest land: state forests, regional forests and private 
forests, it is in the responsibility of the state and regional governments to designate, demarcate 
and register state, regional and protected forests and the lacking capacity to do so and lacking 
transparency in doing so leads to mistrust towards government authorities and uncertainty about 
property rights issues. In such a situation traditional property rights can be annulled at the 
disposal of local officials who may cooperate or not in conserving coffee forest resources.  
 
                                                 
1 45% of the total rural population (25.7 mio) is living under the poverty line. IFAD – the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development - mentions the following causes of rural poverty: wide fluctuations in agricultural 
production as a result of drought, an ineffective and inefficient agricultural marketing system, underdeveloped 
transport and communication networks, underdeveloped production technologies, limited access of rural households 
to support services, environmental degradation, lack of participation by rural poor people in decisions that affect 
their livelihoods (http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/english/regions/africa/eth/index.htm). 
2 In 2005 Ethiopia’s population was estimated at 77.4 million and estimates for the year 2030 project 129 million at 
growth rates of 2.43% (Report on the Ethiopian Economy 2004/05. Ethiopian Economic Association 2005). 
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Uncertainty over property rights is also created due to lacking legislation and 
implementation thereof. For example, the country’s forestry policy has been drafted and re-
drafted over many years without ever being passed. The latest draft received considerable input 
from forestry experts after a conference organised by the Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 
(IBC) and the Ethiopian Coffee Forest Forum (ECFF) in March 2006. Further, from all the 
factors identified to negatively influence the system ‘conservation of coffee forests’, an expert 
workshop carried out by ECFF identified “governance” as the most active variable steering the 
dynamics of the entire system (Gatzweiler and Volkmann 2006). In the absence of effective 
government steering, local level forest management decisions are based on private costs and 
benefits of different land use options. A major issue in forest management is that these private 
costs and benefits are not congruent with social costs and benefits of land use options at the level 
of the national or global society. 
 
This paper explains the divergence of private and social costs and benefits as the 
underlying reason for forest land conversion and degradation in south-western Ethiopia. In order 
to do that we will first present a brief methodological background, and subsequently present the 
results of: 
 
1. An estimation of the economic value of Coffea arabica genetic resources, which grow 
in the afromontane rainforests of Ethiopia, 
2. An economic analysis of competing land use systems in the same area, and  
3. An income analysis at farm level.  
 
The results of 1. and 2. demonstrate the economic values of Coffea arabica genetic 
resources and coffee forest land use systems, while 3. represents the values of individual farmers 
in the coffee forest region whose priority is to sustain their livelihoods. The results of 1. are 
taken from Hein and Gatzweiler (2006), the results from 2. and 3. are taken from Rojahn (2006). 
We will conclude with providing suggestions for closing the divergence between private and 
social values by transposing high values and well meant policies into actual incomes. An 
important element here is customizing an incentive package which would make it worthwhile for 
individual farmers to invest into sustainable forest management and conservation.  
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2 Comparing private and social net benefits 
from land conversion 
 
Conventional economic theory suggests a general decision rule according to which either 
society or the individual will decide in favour of land use alternatives where either social or 
private costs are lower than the benefits attributed to a respective activity (e.g. either converting 
or conserving forests). Once agricultural land becomes unproductive or scarce (e.g. because of 
drought or population pressure) the farmer’s private costs of land management increase to a 
degree at which it is cheaper for him to convert forest into agricultural land instead of investing 
into maintaining the productivity of his current land (maybe because of lacking knowledge on 
sustainable land management practices or expensive inputs required to do so). In doing so he 
reduces forest ecosystem functions to a few production functions that are necessary for keeping 
the farmer’s family alive. Many other functions of the original forest ecosystem (such as habitat 
and information functions of the forest) are deleted and the costs (of not being able to enjoy these 
goods or services or the costs of downstream effects, such as erosion and pollution) are being 
externalised. These costs are passed on to society (Figure 1). Figure 1 further illustrates why 
additional land conversion is economically rational from a private and social perspective, 
depending on the position of the marginal social cost (MSC) curve. 
 
Holden et al. (1998) have shown that Ethiopian (forest coffee) farmers have a very short-
term planning horizon (high discount rates up to 53%) when it comes to accounting for future 
benefits from agricultural and forestry resources. This can be explained by the fact that they have 
to meet immediate subsistence and food security needs and can not afford to invest in long-term 
and capital intensive activities, such as nature conservation, which do not provide short-term 
returns and immediate food security. Hence, the farmers cannot be expected to carry the entire 
costs of conservation and thereby provide benefits to the rest of society. In contrast to the private 
financial perspective, from an economic perspective the sustainable management of forests has a 
value which exceeds that of agricultural use of the forest land. The conversion of forest land into 
crop land and the respective loss of biological diversity in general and wild Coffea arabica 
genetic resource in particular is therefore an ongoing social loss for Ethiopia.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the diverging private and social costs of conservation. MPB / MSB are 
the Marginal Private / Social Benefits, the additional private / social benefits that arise if an 
additional unit of forest land is converted. MPC / MSC are the Marginal Private / Social Costs, 
i.e. the additional private/social costs that arise if an additional unit of forest land is converted. L1 
shows the actual area of converted land and L2 the increase in area of converted land (option). If 
MSC1 (=marginal private costs plus marginal external costs) reflects the true social costs of land 
conversion, the efficient amounts of converted land would be Le1. An increase in land 
conversion (from L1 to L2) is inefficient because social costs would exceed social benefits. If 
MSC2 reflects the true social costs of conversion, an increase of land conversion from L1 to L2 
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and even further until Le2 would be an economically justifiable decision. However, the farmer 
faces the Marginal Private Cost curve (MPC). Irrespective of the location of MSC, he will be 
inclined to pursue further land conversion, up to the point where MPC crosses MPB. It becomes 
clear that the true social costs are crucial in determining the efficiency of land conversion. 
Valuing the external costs of land conversion is therefore fundamental. 
 
In order to solve that problem it is necessary to provide incentives for resource users and 
other stakeholders, to invest in the conservation of coffee forest areas and identify and avoid 
disincentives which prevent forest users from using the forests sustainably.  
 
Figure 1: Land conversion from a private and social perspective (Source: Marggraf 2005:10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The global economic value of Ethiopian wild 
Coffea arabica genetic resources 
 
Most commercial Coffea arabica varieties have been derived from a limited number of 
accessions from Ethiopian forests, and have therefore limited genetic variety to respond to 
potential future pests and diseases (Oerke et al., 1994). The large majority of genetic information 
of Coffea arabica is therefore found in the understories of Ethiopian montane rainforests, which 
are however disappearing fast. Hein and Gatzweiler (2006) attempted an estimation of the 
economic value of these genetic resources. The valuation was based on an assessment of the 
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potential net benefits derived from the application of genetic information in breeding programs. 
A capital investment analysis was conducted which involved the comparison of the discounted 
potential benefits and costs of breeding programs aimed at producing improved coffee cultivars. 
Hein and Gatzweiler (ibid) examine the potential benefits of breeding 1) resistance for three 
major coffee pests and diseases; 2) a low caffeine coffee cultivar; and 3) high yielding coffee 
varieties. The pests and diseases considered were: coffee berry disease (CBD), Meloidogyne spp. 
and coffee rust. Pest and disease resistant cultivars yield economic benefits because they reduce 
yield losses and pesticide costs of coffee growers world-wide. With respect to the breeding of 
low caffeine coffee, the considered economic benefits relate to the avoided costs of 
decaffeinating. It is assumed that the required genetic information to breed these enhanced 
varieties is contained in the wild Coffea arabica populations which grow in the Ethiopian 
rainforests. In the value estimation the authors also assume that in-situ conservation is crucial for 
the maintenance of the Coffea arabica genepool. The reason is that coffee seeds are difficult to 
conserve ex-site because they maintain their germination potential only for two months and it is 
difficult to apply cryo-preservation. To compare present and future costs and benefits, a simple 
discounting procedure was used with a 30 years discounting period and two discount rates (5% 
and 10%). During the first 15 years, the breeding programs will be implemented, which will 
result in economic benefits stemming from increased coffee yields at lower prices in the second 
period of 15 years. Further assumptions and details of the methodology are described in Hein 
and Gatzweiler (2006).  
 
Table 1: Economic value of Ethiopian coffee genetic resources  
NPV (US$ million), at discount rate:  
5% 10% 
Disease resistance 617 169 
- CBD 60 11 
- Meloidogyne spp 231 65 
- Coffee rust 323 94 
Decaffeinated coffee 576 175 
Yield increases 266 75 
Total value 1458 420 
 
The results of the value estimation (Table 1) present a minimum value because the coffee 
genetic material of the wild populations contains more information and is therefore potentially 
useful for other breeding purposes, for example yet unknown diseases or demanded cup qualities 
of coffee. Several assumptions had to be made for this valuation, for example that the breeding 
program would provide for the benefits after 15 years, the replacement rate of enhanced coffee 
varieties and the costs of the breeding program. Also the outcomes of the valuation do not 
provide information on how much forests need to be preserved to maintain the Coffea arabica 
gene pool, because the relationship between forest area and extent of coffee genetic diversity is 
unknown.  
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Nevertheless, the study confirms the institutional failure of conservation. Whereas at a 
global level these genetic resources have high values, for example for coffee breeders and 
growers, but also for conservationists, this value is not an incentive for the local population to 
manage the forest resources sustainably.  
 
 
4 Society’s perspective: Economic analysis of 
competing land use systems in Ethiopia 
 
Reichhuber and Requate (2007) compare three competing land use systems for the Ethiopian 
montane rainforest: 1) Forest conversion and maize production, 2) strict forest conservation and 
3) sustainable semi-forest management. Here we merely refer to the traditional practice of felling 
trees from a forest plot, selling them once and planting maize without fertilizer and pesticide 
input or the use of improved planting material. Strict forest conservation refers to the laws which 
apply with the establishment of the National Forest Priority Areas (NFPA). No encroachment 
into NFPA or felling of trees is tolerated by law and sometimes even punished by prison 
sentences. In practice monitoring and rule enforcement is difficult. Sustainable semi-forest 
management involves the growing of coffee and collecting of other non-timber forest products, 
like spices, medicinal plants or honey.  
 
For the valuation of economic costs and benefits associated with each land use option the 
concept of total economic value (TEV) was applied, which consists of direct, indirect, option and 
non-use values. Non-use values were, however, excluded from the analysis. Direct use values 
included the benefits from timber and fuel wood, as well as maize production. Direct costs 
include damage from wild animals on agricultural fields and the costs associated with the 
implementation of strict conservation measures (e.g. infrastructure development and personnel). 
Values derived from indirect use come from watershed services of the forest, carbon storage 
services and biodiversity provision services. Biodiversity is valued at a national level for 
potential pharmaceutical and agricultural use.  
 
The results shown in Table 2 demonstrate that from the three land use options, only 
maize production and forest management have a positive net present value (NPV). Strict forest 
conservation with no use is not economically viable. This however depends upon the non-use 
value that society attributes to biodiversity conservation. The negative NPV could also be the 
result of missing data on the values for watershed services provided by the forest and incomes 
generated through tourism. 
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Table 2: Net present values of competing land use systems 
NPV per ha at 
discount rates of 
Conversion of 
forest into 
agricultural use 
(traditional 
maize 
production) 
Semi-forest 
coffee 
management 
(sustainable 
forest 
management) 
Strict forest 
protection 
2% 17, 921 28, 135 -276 
5% 17, 620 21, 686 -222 
10% 17,274 15,614 -173 
 
At a discount rate of 5% sustainable semi-forest management was found to be most 
profitable while at 10% discount rates maize production becomes more profitable. Sustainable 
forest management generates income from timber, non-timber products and coffee and is more 
profitable in the medium to long term, where discount rates of 5% apply. In the long run and at 
discount rates of 2% sustainable forest management would be the most viable land use option. 
 
 
5 Financial incentives for the individual 
farmer: Income analysis of two competing 
land uses systems 
 
From the three land use options Reichhuber and Requatte (2007) compared, “strict forest 
conservation” is not included in the income analysis, as it is assumed not to generate income. 
The remaining two are the conversion into farm land which yields returns from logging and 
maize production and sustainable use of the forests, which is characterized by a variety of 
income sources, like coffee, wood products and several non-timber forest products. Further a 
discount rate of 30 and 53% as lower and upper boundaries are assumed. As Holden et al. (1998) 
argue this is mainly because of high environmental risks, low life expectancy and health risks.  
 
The calculations for the traditional maize production system incorporate a yearly 10% 
decline in productivity on deforested land, 1800kg yield per ha and year, and a farm gate price of 
6-7 USD per 100kg. With labor costs for maize production of 48 US$/ha, cultivating one hectare 
of maize leads to net returns of US$ 60 in Sheko in the first year. Applying improved land 
management (improved planting material, fertilizer application and erosion control maize 
production generates a net annual income per hectare of US$ 80.5 in Sheko. 
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From the management of semi-forest coffee systems income can be generated from 
coffee, fuelwood and timber, as well as non timber forest products (NFTPs). These include 
honey, medicinal plants, and miscellaneous goods, such as Brown Cardamom (”Kororima”); 
”Gesho”, a condiment for making a local drink; ”Desha”, used to clean the oven; ”Ensosela”, 
used for decorating the skin with color; mats and baskets made out of a liana and baskets made 
out of bamboo. Details of the calculation of costs and benefits from harvesting these goods are 
given in Reichhuber and Requatte (2007). 
 
The results of the income analysis give an explanation for the deforestation in the area by 
showing that maize production is more profitable than semi-forest coffee management. Net 
incomes from traditional maize production (including the one-time sell of timber) were 
calculated at 6324 and 6274 USD/ha at 30% and 53% discount rates respectively. Whereas 
conventionally managed semi-forest coffee management systems generated 5103 and 3956 
USD/ha at the above mentioned discount rates. 
 
 
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
The results of our economic evaluations have shown that the Ethiopian montane rainforests 
which harbour the last wild Coffea arabica populations have high economic values and that 
financial incentives (under current institutional and governance circumstances) destroy this 
worldwide unique and valuable resource (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Table 3: Financial incentive motivate farmers to convert forests into agricultural 
land despite its high economic value of biodiversity 
NPV in US$, discount 
rates in brackets. 
Conversion of 
forest into 
agricultural use 
Semi-forest coffee 
management Forest protection 
Local-financial values 
(per ha) 
6274  (53%) 
6324  (30%) 
3956  (53%) 
5103  (30%) 
Low to negligible value resulting from 
potential future income from tourism 
National economic 
values (per ha) 
17,274 (10%) 
17,620 (5%) 
15,614 (10%) 
21,686 (5%) 
Value dependent on watershed 
services and the non-use value 
attributed to biodiversity by the people 
of Ethiopia, with potential additional 
revenue from tourism 
Global economic values None 
Some preservation 
of biodiversity and 
coffee genetic 
resources 
- High non-use value related to 
Ethiopia’s unique biodiversity 
- Use value related to maintenance of 
genetic information: US$ 0.4 billion 
(10%); US$ 1,5 billion (5%) 
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The calculations of economic values are estimates and they are based on assumptions and 
scenarios for each calculation. The results confirm theoretical explanations on deforestation and 
biodiversity loss: private and social values of forests diverge and lead to deforestation. Although 
at a global and national level forest resources are valued highly, these values are not translated 
into incentives for local resource users which are in direct interaction with forest resources for 
their livelihoods. Not deforestation because of converting forest into agricultural land by local 
farmers is uneconomic, but the fact that national and global society lets this happen because of 
the failure to translate their willingness to pay for conservation into concrete incentive 
mechanisms for local resource users. In economic terms, that is a waste of forest resources, at 
least partly as a result of lacking capability and will to create new and implement existing 
“institutions of sustainability” (Hagedorn, 2003) – incentives which would allow local 
stakeholders to invest into conservation and sustainable forest and land management. 
 
The waste of forest resources and the failure to change incentive structures could 
however also be due to high transaction costs which may occur, related to establishing local 
incentives for sustainable biodiversity management, and for monitoring compliance with 
restrictions on land conversion. Values and policies are often there but they need to be 
transposed into incomes and action. For such a case, Gatzweiler (2006) has proposed the 
organisation of a “public ecosystem service economy” by changing institutions in a manner that 
relieves local resources users from the cost burden of conservation which society values and 
demands.  
 
Creating incentives for conservation would mean creating “institutions of sustainability” 
in which the farmer can live from his land without having to destroy the ecosystem functions 
which provide for the (self-sustaining) regeneration of ecological goods and services. We have 
identified high discount rates as an important variable in our value estimates. Therefore, part of 
these “institutions of sustainability” need to be incentives which stimulate long term investments 
into the forest or land, for example by securing property rights and reducing further population 
pressures by halting immigration or family planning. If farmers can not use their land (which is 
not “theirs”) as collateral for receiving credits from banks they are condemned to live from hand 
to mouth. For that reason (and having in mind that, according to Nega et al. (2003), the legal 
framework on land issues since the socialist Derge regime show more similarities than 
differences to the current one) Ethiopia is urgently in needs to evaluate the effects of the land 
reform from 1975 and implement land policies which provide for better tenure security.  
 
Other types of incentives are those which make local markets work better by rewarding 
farmers for the goods they can offer on the market. That could mean better prices for organically 
grown or produced goods, like forest coffee or honey. Currently many products harvested from 
the forest are regarded as being provided for free by nature and their price reflects little more 
than the costs for collecting and transporting them. Investing into the quality of products which 
are sustainably managed and adequately paid for, also means investing into people’s capabilities 
by providing education and training. Although setting up a labelling or certification 
ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy 115 
12 
infrastructure for goods harvested from the forest also involves high transaction costs, such 
investments will most probably pay-off in the future. 
 
Changing the circumstances into those which allow local resource users to manage their 
forest and land resources sustainably does not only involve sharing the costs for conservation but 
also lowering the discount rates. Currently the importance of immediate food supply is so high, 
that we need to apply discount rates of up to 53%. The future and sustainable management 
practices are not worth much under such circumstances, where farmers are condemned to live 
from hand to mouth. Mechanisms are therefore needed that ease the dependence on immediate 
food supply and increase food security. This need refers back to the long-term investments 
farmers could make on their own land if it would be their own land.  
 
In addition to incentives which allow local communities to manage resources more 
sustainably, mechanisms are needed at national and global level which translate these values into 
environmental policies which are actually implemented. A prominent example is the reportedly 
successful co-management arrangements for participatory forest management (not only) in 
Ethiopia, with strong support from the government and the international donor community. But 
also general environmental education schemes are an investment into people’s unexploited 
capabilities and thereby indirectly transpose high economic values at national level to innovative 
income opportunities at local level. Environmental taxes or other levies could be another 
mechanism. Tax revenues generated would need to be re-invested into the conservation capacity 
of the country by strengthening conservation education, training and extension services.  
 
We have shown that the global community has considerable benefits from the 
biodiversity of Ethiopia’s montane rainforests. These especially refer to the high values of the 
wild Coffea arabica genetic resources in those forests. Despite the boom of the specialty coffee 
industry (Daviron and Ponte 2005) and the high profits made (OXFAM 2002) a negligible 
amount is re-invested into the conservation of Ethiopia’s montane rainforests and its wild Coffea 
arabica genetic resources. That must be perceived as a great damage for the image and social 
corporate responsibility of the global coffee industry, especially roasters and retailers. Support of 
Ethiopian conservation NGOs, voluntary payments, a conservation tax or other types of levies 
collected at national level could be possible contributions. 
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